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Abstract This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenolog-
ical data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers.
Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the ‘Radical Enactivist’ handling of this issue,
so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the
explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1–2,
focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely
heavily upon the endorsement of a particular explanatory constraint that I call the
structural resemblance constraint (SRC), according to which the structure of our
phenomenology ought to be mirrored in our cognitive science. Sections 3–5 delineate
the nature of, and commitment to, SRC amongst enactivists, showing SRC’s warrant
and implications. The paper then turns to Hutto and Myin’s (2013) handling of SRC in
sections 6–7, highlighting irregularities within their programme for Radical Enactivism
on this issue. Despite seeming to favour SRC, I argue that Radical Enactivism’s
purported compatibility with the narrow (brain-bound) supervenience of perceptual
experience is in fact inconsistent with SRC, given Hutto and Myin’s phenomenological
commitments. I argue that enactivists more broadly ought to resist such a concessionary
position if they wish to tackle the explanatory gap, for it is primarily the abidance to
SRC that ensures progress is made here. Section 8 then concludes the paper with a
series of open questions to enactivists, inviting further justification of the manner in
which they apply SRC.
Keywords Perception . Enactivism . Explanation . Phenomenology. Explanatory gap
Phenom Cogn Sci
DOI 10.1007/s11097-017-9511-5
* Michael Roberts
MDR465@bham.ac.uk
1 Department of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham, B15 2TT,
Birmingham, UK
1 Introductory comments
The last two decades have seen steadily growing interest in the enactive approach
within cognitive science and philosophy (e.g., Colombetti 2014; Noë 2004; Stewart
2010/2014; Thompson 2007). Originally articulated as an approach to understanding
and studying the mind, early enactivism stressed that cognition is best conceived as a
form of embodied action (Varela et al. 1991/1993, p. 172) and made two central claims:
firstly, cognition is ontologically continuous with the basic life-regulation processes of
living organisms (pp. 87–9); secondly, cognition’s nature is strongly dependent upon
the embodiment of the organism in question, and thus the kinds of sensorimotor
interaction with the environment that it can maintain (p. 173). As recently noted (De
Jesus 2016), contemporary enactivist theorising has centred largely upon how best to
systematise and develop the approach, leading to the crystallisation of a number of
competing versions of enactivism that afford varying degrees of significance to the
claims set out in The Embodied Mind (Varela et al. 1991/1993).1 This diversity has
understandably been accompanied by controversy over the authenticity of these differ-
ent approaches to early enactivist ideas (see Di Paolo et al. 2010/2014).
In this paper, however, I am not much concerned with these theoretical details. I am
interested rather in the means by which the basic enactivist picture was originally derived
and the broad repercussions that this has for the future development of enactivist thought.
Specifically, I shall be concerned with the suggestion that enactivism is a thesis arrived at
principally through phenomenological reflection (Thompson and Cosmelli 2011, p. 165).
The founders of enactivism note that their ideas were chiefly derived from the
phenomenological considerations and analyses of Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), which
stress the embodied and interactive qualities of experience, and they mark The Em-
bodied Mind (Varela et al. 1991/1993) as an extension of his research project (p. xv).
This text thus set out a bare-bones model for how the cognitive sciences could proceed
in a way that was informed by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights, namely,
one which focused cognitive science’s empirical lens upon the appropriate horizons: the
embodied interactions maintained between organisms and their environments. Apply-
ing this line of thinking to perceptual cognition, Thompson and Cosmelli note that they
‘use phenomenological considerations about perceptual experience to constrain how
[they] think about the subpersonal mechanisms of perception’ (2011, p. 165) and they
recommend that cognitive science more broadly take this approach, interrogating
subpersonal mechanisms extending across brain, body and environment.2
This paper will be concerned firstly with two important questions that arise in
response to this strategy, especially amongst those unfamiliar with the continental
literature from which enactivism springs: (1) Why ought we to think that phenomeno-
logical considerations should be able to influence our cognitive science? (2) In precisely
what manner should this occur? An initial aim of this paper is to answer these in detail,
1 The main contenders here are autopoietic enactivism (e.g., Thompson 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2010/2014;
Colombetti 2014), sensorimotor enactivism (e.g., O’Regan and Noë 2001; O’Regan 2011; Degenaar and
O’Regan 2015; c.f. Hurley 1998) and radical enactivism (Hutto and Myin 2013). These terms are due to Hutto
and Myin (2013). See Hutto and Myin (2013, pp. 23-36) for a good outline of the principal differences
between these contenders.
2 Those researchers who have taken up this model now make up what is called enactive cognitive science. See
Di Paolo et al. (2010/2014) for more on this.
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for I believe that the motivation for Thompson and Cosmelli’s stated explanatory
strategy remains unfortunately opaque in the literature, particularly to thinkers working
exclusively in the analytic tradition, who have inherited a long-standing suspicion over
the utility of first-person considerations when it comes to theorising about the mind.3
Without clarity here, enactivists have been left open to sustained critique over the
seeming powerful influence that it affords to phenomenological data (e.g. Rupert
2009, 2015) and a persistent misunderstanding of basic enactivist motivations.
I will attempt to rectify this situation in the first half of this paper, unpacking the
reasoning behind Thompson and Cosmelli’s approach at length. I will begin by
sketching some minimal details about enactivism in section 2, before moving on in
section 3 to introduce a particular explanatory constraint that the majority of enactivists
have picked up, which I shall argue can help us to understand why enactivists make the
claims that they do. I call this the structural resemblance constraint (SRC). I shall
outline the justification for SRC in section 4, where I will mark SRC as an attempt to
motivate identity claims between the mental and the physical, and as itself supported by
standalone considerations from the philosophy of science which are familiar to analytic
thinkers. In section 5, I shall then crystallise the manner in which enactivists have made
use of SRC in order to arrive at their views on perception.
The second aim of this paper will then be critical, for the reliance upon SRC within
the enactivist camp is not without its problems. In sections 6–7, I will reveal this
difficulty in the BRadical Enactivism^ of Hutto and Myin (2013). Despite implicitly
supporting SRC as a means of motivating identity claims, I believe that their pro-
gramme for Radical Enactivism contains claims which threaten to undermine SRC
completely. The problem here is Radical Enactivism’s stated consistency with the
narrow (brain-bound) supervenience of perceptual experience. I shall argue that, given
Hutto and Myin’s phenomenological commitments, SRC is inconsistent with narrow
supervenience, and that one of the two must be rejected.
Focusing on the case of Radical Enactivism this way will allowme to arrive at a broader
andmore significant point. I will outline that the endorsement of SRC is critical to the claim
that enactivism can tackle the explanatory gap. As such, I will argue that enactivists must
avoid being concessionary on the issue of supervenience, and reject the possibility of
(perception’s) narrow supervenience, if they wish to preserve enactivism’s progress against
the explanatory gap and promote its further bridging. The remainder of the paper (section 8)
will then offer some questions for enactivists concerning their application of SRC.
2 Basic features of enactivism
To narrow the subject matter, I focus here upon enactivism’s construal of a single subset
of (human) cognition: perception. 4 Speaking very broadly, enactivists claim that
3 For a good recent example of such suspicion, see Schwitzgebel (2008). For a diagnosis of how this suspicion
came to be commonplace, see Hatfield (2005).
4 My treatment of perception takes it to be an essentially conscious process. Though the term is also used to
refer to unconscious aspects of sense-making, it here concerns only those mental states/processes that there is
Bsomething it is like^ for the subject to undergo. In the remainder of the paper, I will thus equivocate between
perception and perceptual experience, as is common amongst enactivists. I will also use the term ‘process’
rather than ‘state’, given the enactivist understanding of perception as something which takes time to happen.
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perception is a way of acting in the world, wherein a meaningful perceptual world is
constituted at least partly by the specific activities the organism performs (Noë 2004; Di
Paolo et al. 2010/2014, pp. 39–40). Enactivists suggest that perception consists not
merely in receiving the world, but also in choosing which parts of the world one will be
affected by, which aspects of the world are brought into an organism’s sensorimotor
loop (Stewart 2010/2014, p. 3), shown in Fig. 1.
To explain, the embodied activity of the organism (O) is said to determine the
aspects of the environment (E) that will impinge upon it, and thus its next sensory
inputs, while those sensory inputs are used to guide the motor actions that are needed to
sustain things within this loop, themselves required to maintain the organism’s viability
(Stewart 2010/2014, pp. 1–4; Thompson 2007). A central claim of enactivism is
therefore that both of these sensory and motor processes go into perception.
For present purposes, the details of this process are insignificant. We need only
observe that the circular phenomenon outlined in Fig. 1 is christened as the ‘enaction’
or ‘bringing forth’ of a world (Varela et al. 1991/1993, p. 205), that is, the allowing of
something to present itself or to show up for the organism. Given this account of
perception, it is crucially important for the enactivist that one be in constant contact
with the environment out of which a world is enacted. Accordingly, it has become
common more recently to regard the enactive understanding of perception as something
not merely active and embodied, but also interactive. Thompson and Cosmelli have
thus qualified in a more recent article that ‘to perceive is to be in an interactive
relationship with the world’ (2011, p. 165; c.f. Noë 2004; Pepper 2014; Ward 2012).
Now, this is an understanding that, as I have said, is purported to arise from
phenomenological considerations about the nature of perceptual experience. I suggest
that enactivist motivations to assert this understanding depend not merely upon a
certain Merleau-Pontian phenomenological picture, but also upon the concomitant
endorsement of a particular explanatory constraint that I call the structural resemblance
constraint (SRC).
MotorSensory 
E 
O 
Fig. 1 A sensorimotor loop (arrows show direction of influence)
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3 The structural resemblance constraint
SRC is a constraint upon explanations of conscious/phenomenal mental processes
(those that there is something it is like to undergo) within cognitive science. Before
outlining SRC, it will be useful to outline two broad distinctions that can help identify
the type of explanation that SRC targets.
Firstly, we have a distinction between horizontal explanations and vertical expla-
nations (Cummins 1983). Horizontal explanations seek to account for something’s
occurrence by proffering a sequence of distinct preceding events (c.f. Drayson 2012;
Bermúdez 2006). For example, we might seek to explain the occurrence of a tornado by
reference to a series of pressure fronts and air moisture levels converging over time.
This form of explanation thus thematises why or how something was brought about.
Contrastingly, we have vertical explanations, which offer some set of constituent parts
and relations that collaboratively make up or constitute some phenomenon, thereby
accounting for its features and causal powers (c.f. Drayson 2012, p. 2). For example,
we might explain the properties and causal powers of a tornado by referencing the real-
time internal rotation dynamics of the air it contains. This form of explanation thus
thematises what something is made of.
Both of these forms of explanation are found within cognitive science. For example,
a clinical psychologist might explain some emotion by citing a person’s previous
attitudes and negative experiences - a horizontal explanation. Contrastingly, a cognitive
neuroscientist might seek to explain the same emotion by relating the set of neuronal
processes and relations sufficient to constitute it - a vertical explanation.
With this distinction on the table, I can state that it is solely vertical explanations that
concern SRC. Furthermore, it is complete, rather than partial, vertical explanations
which SRC targets - those which seek to proffer the necessary and sufficient constituent
parts and relations of some phenomenon. A second distinction helps to further clarify
the kind of vertical explanations of interest here. This is a distinction between personal-
level and subpersonal-level explanations.
A personal-level explanation will invoke that which we ordinarily ascribe to whole
persons (e.g. beliefs, desires and experiences) in its explanatory narrative. It will speak
in personal terms. This is the mainstay of folk psychology, where we might explain
some individual’s behaviour, say, by invoking their preceding desires. A subpersonal-
level explanation, meanwhile, will invoke things that we do not ordinarily ascribe to
whole persons. It will speak in subpersonal terms taken from the larger domain of
inquiry from which the explanation emerges. For example, a neurological explanation
of some mental process will speak in the terms of neurological theories, such as
Bneuronal activations^ or Blong-range synchrony ,^ while a quantum-mechanical theory
will use very different terms.
While I am concerned here solely with vertical explanations, it is perfectly possible
for these to proceed at either the personal or subpersonal-level. For example, Intro-
spectionist thinkers (e.g. Titchener 1899) have offered accounts of mental processes as
being built out of simpler experiential elements or atoms, thereby giving vertical
explanations in personal-level terms. 5 However, these kinds of explanation (both
vertical and personal-level) are not typically considered the task of contemporary
5 See Kriegel (2015) for a contemporary exploration of related ideas.
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cognitive science, and I set these aside here too. Cognitive science is routinely taken to
account for the personal-level in terms of the subpersonal-level, and it is this kind of
subpersonal vertical explanation that SRC concerns. This clears the space to offer its
full outline.
The structural resemblance constraint (SRC) An explanation of some conscious
mental process X (which is vertical and subpersonal) should reveal a strong structural
resemblance between (a) the combined constituent parts and relations that it invokes
and (b) X as it is best characterised phenomenologically.
This needs unpacking. Firstly, a structural resemblance holds iff two relata possess
some shared set of structural features, i,e. iff a mapping of one domain onto the other
preserves at least some of its structural relations. If two relata share such structural
features, it will be possible to abstract away from the two to reveal a structural
description (a formal model) that is equally accurate in describing both (Bayne 2004,
p. 360). The limit case of this is an isomorphism, where the mapping is both one-to-one
and fully structure preserving.
Given that a set of shared structural features can be larger or smaller, structural
resemblance occurs on a spectrum. For example, suppose we have three pencils, all of
which possess the same overall macro-shape (all are equally long, pointed cylinders).
The first two will be more strongly structurally resemblant to each other than they will
be to the third, if these two are both traditional wooden pencils with a common simple
internal make-up, while the third is a mechanical pencil with its own more complex
internal organisation.
Secondly, as to precisely how strong a resemblance SRC demands, we can think of
this as a question of degree; the stronger the resemblance revealed, the more satisfac-
tory the explanation will be, having taken all other factors into account. I will return to
this important issue later.
Finally, relata (b) in SRC refers only to the entity as invoked and characterised
intrinsically by our best phenomenological accounts, rather than in terms of the causal
role it plays within a larger system, or the relations it holds to other mental processes.
Regarding what our best phenomenological accounts might be, and where they might
come from, I will tackle these issues in subsequent sections.
Now, SRC is a weaker formulation of the structural isomorphism constraint picked
up in the work of Lutz (2002), Metzinger (2000, pp. 67-9), Varela (1997) and Wheeler
(2005, p. 133, pp. 225-236, 2013, p. 147), thus allowing for degrees of explanatory
value to emerge, rather than proposing an all-or-nothing bargain.6 I also believe that
SRC is implicitly endorsed in the work of a majority of self-avowed Benactivist^
thinkers, as I shall go some way to demonstrate. I am in favour of such
endorsement, for I believe that SRC is valuable as an explanatory constraint.
However, I think the reasons for this are not always transparent in the literature
6 Though these thinkers speak in terms of ‘isomorphism’ rather than ‘resemblance’, I suspect that most of
them would be willing to grant the value of this weaker formulation. Also worth noting here, while it is
common to invoke dynamical-systems-theory (DST) as providing an appropriate kind of abstract model (a
mathematical model, in this case) with which to capture a structural resemblance (e.g. Lutz 2002), SRC is
itself more general and can allow for less technical models to be utilised. We can therefore think that a
structural resemblance holds to the extent the any broadly-construed abstract structural model can be applied to
both relata.
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at present. As such, I want to offer a standalone justification for SRC here. This
manner of selling SRC will show it to tap directly into more mainstream
explanatory concerns in the philosophy of science and mind, thereby attempting
to make enactivism more comprehensible to a broader swathe of thinkers and,
simultaneously, opening up a larger store of existing philosophical material for
enactivists to use in support of their views. In brief, I wish to implicate SRC as
no more than a specific application of something more widely discussed: a
constraint upon reduction in the sciences. Doing this will allow me to make
two points in support of SRC: (A) SRC mirrors a specific criterion for ontolog-
ical reduction in the sciences that serves to increase the intelligibility of making
identity claims, and thus (B) SRC assuages broader extant philosophical concerns
about subpersonal accounts of conscious mental processes. (A) is the central point,
while (B) shows the benefit of (A) in the realm of cognitive science.7 Let us take
(A) first.
4 Reduction and identity
Before beginning, an account of reduction must be offered. A loose sense of the idea as
given in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy will be sufficient here:
The term ‘reduction’ as used in philosophy expresses the idea that if an entity x
reduces to an entity y then y is in a sense prior to x, is more basic than x, is such
that x fully depends upon it or is constituted by it. Saying that x reduces to y
typically implies that x is nothing more than y or nothing over and above y (van
Riel and Van Gulick 2016, ‘Scientific Reduction’, para 1, emphasis in original)
What then are some reasonable constraints upon a reduction? I will look here at
some recent comments on this issue in Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism
(2013). By examining the criteria invoked here, which Hutto and Myin themselves
endorse, we shall see that SRC offers merely a domain-specific application of one such
criterion. Consequently, by interrogating the reasons given in favour of such a criterion,
we shall have reasons in favour of SRC.8
Hutto and Myin (2013) first note that contemporary philosophy of science no longer
holds inter-theoretic reductions to require strict a priori deduction of the truths of one
domain from the truths of another (p. 175), as is sometimes stipulated concerning the
mental and its relation to the physical (e.g. Chalmers 2010, p. 244). This is considered
unnecessarily demanding and not to reflect the standards typically accepted in science,
given that it does not allow for the possibility of theory correction (Churchland 1989;
Schaffner 1993; Bickle 1998). Instead, Hutto and Myin (2013) highlight Churchland’s
‘New Wave’ criteria for reduction, noting that a reduction should rather preserve the
‘image of the higher-order theory’ in the lower-order theory on offer, and thus its
7 Some enactivists may immediately balk at the sight of (A), most obviously those expounding avowedly
Bnon-reductive^ theories of mind (e.g. Colombetti 2014; Thompson 2007). I address this issue in f13.
8 As to the significance of Hutto and Myin’s endorsement of such criteria, this will be returned to in the second
half of the paper.
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explanatory and predictive resources (pp. 175–6; Churchland 1989, pp. 49–53).9 The
higher-order here is the reduced theory, while the lower-order is the reducing theory.
Now, given that the preservation of a theory’s explanatory and predictive resources
might reasonably be thought to be entailed by the preservation of its image, I will focus
purely on this latter criterion here. What then does the preservation of an image entail?
To make things simpler (and for consistency with the characterisation of reduction
given at the beginning of this section) I address this question from the perspective of
ontological reduction, rather than theory reduction. This is to target the reduction of
individual objects or properties referenced within particular theories, rather than whole
theories themselves. There is no significant difference in the reductive criteria here; one
aims to preserve the image of these, in a lower-order explanation. Let us flesh out how
this might happen then.
When reducing some higher-level object, a reductive theory will first need to invoke
its own specific (i) ontology and (ii) dynamics, i.e. it will offer (i) some lower-level
objects and (ii) some account of how these things are disposed to behave (that is to say,
it affords them certain properties). It will then cook up an account of the relationship
between those objects which can be seen to yield some macroscopic properties that
mirror the properties of the higher-level entity being targeted for explanation. A
macroscopic property here refers to some property instantiated at a scale larger than
that of the lower-level objects themselves. Put differently, it is a property that occurs at
the system-level rather than the component-level. (If it spans the whole system, it is
called a global property). Let us then take an example of the above procedure.
When reducing human biology to cell biology, one might take a human heart (a
specific higher-level object, with properties disposing it to behave a certain way). One
might then, from within the lower-level theory, outline how assemblies of muscle cells
are disposed to coordinate over time via electrical signals so as to create periodically
fluctuating global pressure levels across the assembly, a disposition which will itself be
seen to mirror the heart’s disposition to expand and contract (or beat). Here one is thus
invoking some lower-level ontology and dynamics, i.e. some set of cells which are
disposed to behave in particular ways, and concocting an account of their relationship
that can be seen to yield some macroscopic property that is a mirror image of higher-
level properties of the human heart.10
We can see that the production of such an image is equivalent to the demonstration
of a strong structural resemblance between the two relata, for a mirror image can be
subject to a relatively detailed abstract level of structural description that is equally
applicable to that which it mirrors.11 It is for this reason that I claim SRC is a domain
9 Referring to the higher-order theory as the ‘older theory’, and the lower-order as the ‘newer theory’,
Churchland states: ‘A reduction consists in the deduction, within TN [the newer theory], not of TO [the older
theory] itself, but rather of a roughly equipotent image of TO, an image still expressed in vocabulary proper to
TN […] the older theory, accordingly, is never deduced; it is just the target of relevantly adequate mimicry.’
(1989, p. 49).
10 I am here narrating only how intrinsic features/properties of the higher-level can be mirrored. Churchland
himself talks of mirroring both intrinsic features/properties and roles/functions within a larger system (1989, p.
52). I do not focus on these latter two here, given that replicating something’s intrinsic features will also enable
it to play the same causal/functional role (see Drayson 2012, p. 2).
11 Indeed, for something to count as a mirror, it must replicate a fairly large set of structural features. The less
it preserves, the more distorting the mirror and the nearer it approaches a loss of mirror status, and thus its
capacity to present an image.
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specific application of this criterion for reduction. If we want, we can thus substitute the
vocabulary of reduction into SRC and say that (a) the combined constituent parts and
relations invoked by our cognitive science, should comprise a system that instantiates
macroscopic properties displaying an imagistic relation to the properties invoked in
relatum (b) of SRC.
Returning to relatum (b) here, it is important to remember that the target to be
mirrored by our cognitive science is always some conscious process. This means firstly
that the relationship between the constituent parts invoked will need to be a dynamic
one (given its being a process, i.e. something which changes over time) and, secondly,
that the target will be provided and characterised as a target through phenomenological
reflection (given its being a conscious process). It is on account of this second and more
significant point that SRC invokes phenomenological characterisations in its outline;
phenomenological theory is the higher-level theoretical domain which constructs the
targets that cognitive science is to mirror.12
Now that we have all this on the table, we can ask: what is the benefit of SRC? Here
we can reintroduce points (A) and (B) from above:
(A) SRC mirrors a specific criterion for ontological reduction in the sciences that
serves to increase the intelligibility of making identity claims.13
(B) SRC assuages broader extant philosophical concerns about subpersonal accounts
of conscious mental processes.
Point (A) is fairly simple; the production of an image of the higher-level, within the
conceptually richer lower-level theory, motivates us to believe that both areas of inquiry
have indeed managed to latch onto the very same worldly entity (c.f. Churchland 1989,
p. 52; Metzinger 2000, pp. 67–69). Put differently, the structural resemblance that has
been revealed gives us a strong reason to think that the two levels of description are in
fact describing one and the same thing in approximately correct ways. Of course,
identity relations demand a complete isomorphism between two relata. But given that
we ought not expect our science to quickly arrive at some Bcomplete and final theory^
of the mental, nor ought we to expect even our best phenomenology to be completely
immune from any error, a strong structural similarity still provides strong reasons to
claim identity (c.f. Churchland 1989, p. 52; Metzinger 2000). Similarly, it seems that
the stronger the structural resemblance revealed, the more intelligible it is to make such
claims. Strong resemblance relations give a good vertical explanation what Gillett calls
‘ontologically unifying power’ in this way (2016, pp. 225–7). What precisely ought
12 It will be noted that I have outlined/compared only the detail for a retentive reduction in this section, where
that which is reduced retains its conceptual validity, as when one reduces the biological to the chemical (see
Bickle 1992). I do this on account of our explanatory target in SRC being the output of our best phenome-
nology, which I here assume to be accurate enough to resist any eventual elimination. A retentive reduction is
thus set in contrast to a replacement reduction, which eliminates that which it reduces, e.g. in the case of
phlogiston theory. I will say more on this important issue of phenomenological accuracy in sections 5, 6 and 8.
13 It is worth emphasising here that I am only suggesting that SRC mirrors one criterion for reduction in point
(A), i.e. that which I believe to be critically important for motivating identity claims. One might reasonably
argue that this is a necessary but insufficient condition for reduction, and that there are additional reasons that
the enactivist will wish to construe their approach as non-reductive. See, for example, Thompson (2007) for
reasons in favour of a non-reductive construal of enactivism, and Bayne (2004, pp. 258-9) for a contrasting
appraisal.
Phenomenological constraints
one’s identity claims to feature? The set of constituent parts and relations themselves, or
the macroscopic features that these display? The answer to this will depend upon one’s
position on multiple realization. Opting for the former would be to equivocate between
a relation of constitution and identity, and to deny any metaphysical difference between
the whole and its appropriately arranged parts. Opting for the latter and identifying the
mental with (physically-realized) macroscopic processes would be to make room for
multiple realizability (c.f. Papineau 1998, pp. 377–8). I leave this choice to others,
given that it has no bearing on the value of SRC as such.
From (A), we can arrive at the second and more pointed advantage of SRC: (B) SRC
assuages broader extant philosophical concerns about subpersonal accounts of con-
scious mental processes. Specifically, SRC respects the intuition that our subpersonal
scientific accounts of the mental and our phenomenological accounts should in some
sense fit together. This is a criterion that McDowell (1994) has previously offered,
recently emphasised by Wheeler (2005, 2013). McDowell (1994) notes that our
scientific accounts should not be ‘phenomenologically off-key’; they ought not seek
to identify the mental with things that do not fit onto (or match the pitch of, to extend
the musical metaphor) our best phenomenological accounts. What then would it mean
to be phenomenologically on-key? I think we can see that this is precisely what one is
doing when seeking to satisfy Churchland’s criteria, which I have shown SRC to be a
domain specific version of. Specifically, it is by so constructing an image or ‘analogue’
(Churchland 1989, p. 52) of that which is postulated at the higher (phenomenological)
level, within the lower (scientific) level, that we match its pitch. Such an imagistic/
analogic relation between the two ensures a phenomenologically on-key account. 14
Without such a relation, our cognitive science remains phenomenologically
impoverished and we are left feeling that something is missing.
Having outlined SRC then, we are now in a position to return to the questions raised
at the end of section 1: (1) Why ought we to think that phenomenological consider-
ations should be able to influence our cognitive science? And (2) in precisely what
manner should this occur? We can answer (1) by saying that a scientific account can
better motivate identity claims by doing justice to the phenomenology (and thus being
constrained by it). We can answer (2) by saying that cognitive science can do justice to
the phenomenology by demonstrating a strong structural resemblance to that which
phenomenological reflection sets up.
Let us now return to the issue of perception then, as we began, and apply SRC here.
Doing this, we see that we are immediately faced with an important question: what is
the appropriate phenomenological picture of perception to be mirrored? SRC makes the
14 The distinction between these two roughly matches McDowell’s distinction between a constitutive under-
standing and an enabling understanding. A constitutive understanding, Wheeler (2013) notes, ‘concerns the
identification, articulation and clarification of the conditions that determine what it is for a phenomenon to be
the phenomenon that it is’ (pp. 142–3). Rather confusingly here, a McDowellian constitutive understanding is
thus a case of clarifying what the target for explanation actually is, the domain of phenomenology in the
current context. An enabling understanding concerns ‘the causal elements, along with the organization of, and
the systematic causal interactions between, those elements, that together make intelligible to us how a
phenomenon of the kind could be realized or generated in a world like ours’ (p. 143); this is the domain of
cognitive science here. A good enabling understanding can therefore make the constituted object intelligible
by offering an account of causal elements and relations that can be seen to realize (rather than generate, in this
context) analogic macroscopic processes.
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answer to this critical. So let us see the enactivist response. Doing so will enable us to
understand precisely how the enactive account of perception is derived.
5 Enactivist phenomenology and its consequences
Central to enactivism is the claim that, phenomenologically, perceptual experience is an
episode of real-time interaction with the environment (Noë 2004; Thompson and
Cosmelli 2011; Ward 2012). Interactivity is purportedly invoked in our most rigorous
and accurate phenomenological accounts, themselves held to emerge from the methods
of (amongst other things) continental phenomenology and Buddhist mindfulness prac-
tice (Colombetti 2014; Depraz et al. 2003; Varela and Shear 1999; Varela et al. 1991/
1993). Of course, enactivists list numerous additional phenomenological properties of
perception—for example, that one half of such interaction comprises a felt-body, that
acts as a subjective and affectively charged pole of such interaction (see Thompson
2007; Colombetti 2014)—but it is this broad phenomenological structure of interaction
with an environment (i.e. with something external to, or transcending, the subject of
perception) that I wish to focus on to serve the purposes of the present argument. Let us
entertain some example descriptions then, where this picture emerges.
O’Regan and Noë (2001) exemplify the enactivist stance using the ‘feel of a
Porsche’, an experience that they say is naturally expressed, phenomenologically, in
terms of the particular ‘Porsche-like give and take’ between us, the car and the
environment (pp. 79–80). When asked to describe such an experience, we talk of
Porsche-specific responses to our actions. We talk of the way the Porsche handles, the
fact that it accelerates quickly when we press on the accelerator for example, pulling us
swiftly away with it, and more general facts about both (i) our own activity and (ii) the
way the Porsche responds to us. What we have here is synchronic interaction, between
subject and object.15
Let’s take another more concrete example: the feeling of hardness associated with
perceiving a table by touch. This might be described by the enactivist as a sense of
resistance to one’s action. No matter how hard one pushes against the table, the table
pushes back. It does not give way. The feeling of hardness should be described in terms
of the refusal of that object to be perturbed by the subject, and its exertion of force back
upon the subject in response to attempts to distort it.
Enactivists would also wish to extend this kind of phenomenological account to
more difficult perceptual experiences, the apprehension of colour for example. An
enactivist might here wish to highlight the artist Kandinsky’s description of the
phenomenological difference between yellow and blue: ‘if two circles are drawn
painted respectively yellow and blue, brief concentration will reveal in the yellow a
spreading movement out from the centre, and a noticeable approach to the spectator.
15 It’s important to emphasise that this description concerns the feel of a Porsche, not the feel of the
experience. It has been common in the consciousness literature to sometimes speak of experiences themselves
having Bfeels^, or Bfeeling a certain way to a subject^, creating additional complications in explanation (see
Hacker 2002; Janzen 2008, chpt. 2). I am generally suspicious of such reference to second-order feels,
however, and take all phenomenological descriptions in this paper to be direct accounts of the experiences
themselves (i.e. of their qualities).
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The blue, on the other hand, moves in upon itself, like a snail retreating into its shell,
and draws away from the spectator.’ (1914/1977, pp. 36–7).
Certainly, one might dispute such phenomenological claims—which is an important
point we shall return to later—though stating them overtly here should make crystal-
clear the further conclusion that enactivists draw about perception.16 Given enactivists’
widespread commitment to both (i) SRC and (ii) interactive phenomenology, an
interactively structured cognitive-science account fits better than a non-interactive
one. We have no more than an inference to the best explanation (Rupert 2015, p. 157).
Of course, shared interactivity alone gives only a fairly weak structural resemblance
without detail regarding the substructures contained within each pole of interaction, or
the kind of interaction involved.17 Convincing accounts of perception should aim to
mirror as many phenomenological features as possible in order to strengthen the
resemblance. However, enactivists think that their explanations can also account for
just as broad a swathe of these additional features as can competing accounts of
perception (which tend to miss interactivity), thus making the resemblance that enactive
scientific accounts display stronger, and their explanations more satisfying.
Now that we have these central enactivist commitments on the table—a commitment
to (i) SRC and (ii) interactive phenomenology—we can better understand why
enactivists make the claims they do about perception. For example, Thompson and
Cosmelli remark that ‘given this [interactive] conception of perceptual experience, we
can’t specify the mechanisms of perception only in terms of what goes on in the brain
without including the body and its dynamic sensorimotor coupling with the environ-
ment’ (2011, p. 165). This claim can be understood by noting that it rests on an implicit
endorsement of SRC. The authors see a cognitive-scientific explanation yielding global
processes labelled in terms of Bdynamic sensorimotor coupling^ as the most viable
means of mirroring the interactivity of the phenomenology.18
Taking SRC as an implicit commitment also enables us to understand similar claims
made by Ward (2012, p. 734), who notes that enactivists’ phenomenological commit-
ments make it ‘natural to adopt a complementary conception at the subpersonal level
[…] it is natural for them to resist a subpersonal conception restricted to the neural
activity of the organism engaged in such interaction [for example].’ I suggest that the
Bnatural^ pull of such manoeuvres stems from a tacit commitment to SRC, which I
16 In fact, we shall see that it is crucial for enactivists to hold fast to the principle that phenomenological
descriptions can be open to error, for such a proposal will undergird their strategies for addressing the
explanatory gap (see sections 6 and 8). I am in general agreement with such a position on fallibility. However,
it should be noted that, while some stress the pervasive unreliability of introspective judgement across a broad
swathe of areas (e.g. Schwitzgebel 2008), the arguments in the remainder of this paper rely mostly on only a
narrow range being held questionable. We might want to remain cautious, for example, about questioning the
authority of a subject’s judgements concerning the occurrence of particular mental states. Yet, I think that we
are certainly justified in holding fallible judgements about that in virtue of which such a state has a particular
content/character (i.e. the structural qualities that, for instance, make an experience an experience of hardness).
And fallibility concerning these latter types of judgement is the important thing here.
17 I here, and henceforward, use Binteraction^ as shorthand for temporally-extended, synchronic interaction
between an organism and aspects of the environment that are external to the subject of perception.
18 A similar example of such an approach to explanation, which talks in terms reminiscent of dynamic
sensorimotor coupling, is Bruineberg and Rietveld’s ‘Radical Embodied Cognitive Science’ (2014). This
seeks to utilise existing cognitive scientific concepts, such as Baffordances^, Bsensory feedback^, Bprediction
error^ and Bfree-energy^ etc., in order to offer explanations yielding macroscopic processes labelled as Bself-
organizing brain-body-environment systems^, mirroring the phenomenology at issue.
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have shown to be supported by standalone considerations from the philosophy of
science.19
When entertaining Ward’s remark, it is also important to appreciate that combining
SRC with an enactivist phenomenology allows enactivism to remain fully compatible
with the continued reference to neural activity or neural representations in cognitive
scientific accounts of perception. The point is merely that an enactivist will not seek to
identify perception with such things. Any cognitive scientific account will always
invoke manifold component parts involved in the realization of some mental process,
which needn’t do justice to the phenomenology, and which can be studied as important
standalone phenomena (Ward 2012, p. 733). It is perfectly possible therefore for neural
representations, for example, to play a role (i.e. at the component level) in the
realization of macroscopic interactivity. This is an important nuance recently stressed
by Wheeler (2013).20
Now that the nature of SRC has been delineated then, along with its warrant and
implications, I wish to approach more critical points. I am concerned specifically with
the ‘Radical Enactivism’ of Hutto and Myin (2013) which, despite seeming to implic-
itly endorse SRC, makes other claims that I think withdraw from its full implications
and threaten to undermine the enactivist project. The problematic claim here is the
supposed compatibility of Radical Enactivism with an entirely narrow (i.e. brain-
bound) supervenience base for perceptual experience. To draw out this problem in
the next section, I will first sketch the nature of Hutto and Myin’s endorsement of SRC
and will then outline the problematic claims. This will enable me to bring out the
broader point that enactivists must resist such a manoeuvre, if they wish to maintain
that enactivism can address the explanatory gap.
6 Radical enactivism and SRC
Hutto and Myin (2013) have recently set out ‘Radical Enactivism’. This is a form of
enactivism which begins with the science, rather than the phenomenology, and applies
considerations about the individuation of cognitive systems in order to recommend an
interactively structured cognitive science of the mind. For Hutto and Myin, philosoph-
ical critique of our cognitive science can demonstrate that (i) cognitive systems do not
always terminate at the skin, and (ii) cognitive science need not always utilise the
notion of internal ‘content’ (i.e. representations that are subject to accuracy conditions)
in order to satisfactorily explain the mind.21 Radical Enactivism therefore falls broadly
into line with the central enactivist emphasis upon the need to understand and conceive
of the mind in terms of world-involving interaction (p. 4). In this section, I wish to look
at some of the claims that Hutto and Myin make about the philosophical implications of
such ideas. I focus specifically upon the conclusion of their radical enactivist manifesto,
for it is here that we can see their implicit endorsement of SRC.
19 I shall return to Ward’s own reasons for this conclusion in section 7, when they will become important for
appraising enactivism’s capacity to address the explanatory gap.
20 Though see Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, pp. 93-4) for more sceptical thoughts on the plausibility of
‘representation’ at this componential level.
21 It is the emphatic rejection of the idea the cognition necessarily involves content that is said to afford this
version of enactivism its purported radicalism (Hutto and Myin 2013, p. 8).
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At the end of their programme for Radical Enactivism, Hutto and Myin come to
address the question of the ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983). The explanatory gap is our
purported inability to provide or reveal an intelligible link, or a conceptual overlap,
between the physical and the mental, with our explanations (Davies 2008). Hutto and
Myin note that any account which fails to do this will leave only unintuitive identity
claims (2013, chp. 8). The authors also note that they too are out to endorse a strict
identity thesis and suggest that ‘belief in such identities can and should be motivated’
(p. 157), thus expressing the belief that the explanatory gap can be closed. To do this,
they suggest that most philosophers must go through a process of ‘reconceiving’ (or,
more appropriately, fixing) the phenomenological accounts that feature in their identity
claims (p. 176). They state:
Like other enactivists, we reject the standard ways of characterising the
‘phenomeno’ side of phenomeno-physical identity claims. The difficulty with
other existing conceptions of phenomenal properties is that their advocates are
wedded to confused pictures of what is to be identified, when they imagine the
relata to be qualia and brain states (p. 176)
‘Qualia’ is a notoriously complex term, denoting a particular conception of phe-
nomenal properties that usually ascribes to them at least some of the following set of
(second-order) properties: intrinsically qualitative, private, ineffable, incorrigible,
atomic etc. (p. 156; c.f. Dennett 1991/1993). It is unnecessary to go through the entire
list here though. What the authors seems to be particularly concerned with in this
context is the suggestion that phenomenal properties are both ineffable and non-
dynamic. ‘As long as this picture [of the phenomenal] remains in play,’ they note,
‘there can be no progress in understanding how phenomenality intelligibly relates to, or
might be instantiated in, nature’ (p. 157). They suggest instead that we ought to invoke
phenomenological accounts that are ‘in tune with’ (ibid.) the way that we naturally
speak about our experiences. They remark, ‘[n]aturally occurring ‘what it feels like’
illocutions take activities as their natural objects. When we describe phenomenal
experience, we cannot help but mention environment-involving interactions’ (p. 177).
As such, we see the same phenomenological picture recommended as was outlined in
section 5. What’s more, it is important to stress that we are asked to reconceive our
phenomenology in such an interactive manner because these accounts are supposedly
more accurate, not simply because they are natural, nor because they help us argu-
mentatively. But what argumentative function does this Brevised^ (or fixed) phenom-
enology serve? How does it help us work against the explanatory gap?
Hutto and Myin continue, in what is I think is the crucial comment, stating that ‘the
plausibility of the proposed identities [been the physical and the phenomenal] looks
entirely different, and far less contrived, if it is assumed that the phenomenal character
of experiences must, ultimately, be understood by appealing to interactions between
experiencers and aspects of their environment’ (2013, pp. 176–177). This seems to me
to be nothing other than a commitment to SRC; we can lessen contrivances, and
therefore motivate identity claims, by making our relata appropriately resemblant in
structure. Having recommended an interactively shaped cognitive scientific account of
perceptual experience, they suggest an interactively shaped phenomenological one with
which to pair it. Hutto and Myin remark that they ‘foreground the ways in which
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environment-involving activities are required for understanding and conceiving of
phenomenality [and] abandon attempts to explain phenomeno-physical identities in
deductive terms for attempts to motivate belief in such identities by reminding us of our
common ways of thinking and talking about phenomenal experience.’ (2013, p. 177)
Here, we therefore see an attempt to provide conceptual overlap between the mental
and physical via a revisionary stance on phenomenal properties.
We can also see here that Hutto and Myin are therefore abiding by SRC from the
reverse direction to Thompson and Cosmelli (2011). Having spent their outline of
Radical Enactivism arguing for the need to approach the mind subpersonally (in
cognitive science) in terms of world-involving interaction—using metaphysical argu-
ments about the individuation of systems and what they call the ‘Hard Problem of
Content’ (p. xv)—they then invoke interactive phenomenology post-hoc as a means to
generate structural resemblance and validate such a subpersonal framing of perception.22
Yet in so doing, they seem to be promoting SRC in essentially the same manner. We can
construe this kind of argumentative manoeuvre as a direct counter to the concerns of
Rupert (2015), for example. Evaluating the strength of enactivist theories, Rupert draws
an unfavourable assessment of their supposed progress against the explanatory gap
through invoking subpersonal interactions, asking ‘[h]ow could that stuff—interaction
with the environment, for example—be phenomenal experience? It doesn’t seem at all
like consciousness’ (2015, p. 161).23 Hutto and Myin would be apt to respond here by
saying ‘yes, it doesn’t seem like experience, because you are working with a confused
phenomenology’. Rupert is unpersuaded because he seems to take the phenomenal
properties of perception to be non-dynamic (i.e. non-interactive) while, for the
enactivist, dynamism is characteristic - it’s dynamism all the way down. Rupert
thus perceives an explanatory gap to remain because of his conception of the
phenomenal. Radical Enactivism seeks to work against the explanatory gap by
offering a re-conception of the phenomenal.24 So far, so good.25
Yet all is not well with Radical Enactivism. My concern here is Hutto and Myin’s
insistence that Radical Enactivism is compatible with the narrow supervenience of
perceptual experience. Examining this now can help bring out a larger point about the
22 Clearly, Hutto and Myin are invoking a different kind of phenomenological source to that of Thompson, for
example, who invokes the results of more disciplined kinds of investigation (e.g. 2007, 2015; Thompson and
Cosmelli 2011; Varela et al. 1991/1993). See section 8 for more on this issue.
23 Despite being unclear in this quote, the enactivist need not construe all forms of experience in terms of
interaction. I am concerned here only with perception, which is argued to have such character, but other
experiences (e.g. pain, or emotion) need not.
24 In this sense then, Radical Enactivism joins other enactivists in rejecting any metaphysical gap between the
mental and the physical (see e.g. Noë and O’Regan 2002). It maintains the existence only of an epistemic gap,
occurring at the level of individuals, which can be appropriately addressed (i.e. closed) by providing those
individuals with better phenomenology.
25 Rupert has a further counter to enactivist suggestions here, arguing that structure is tangential to the issue at
hand. Linking the explanatory gap to the hard problem (given that bridging the explanatory gap would solve
the hard problem) he states, ‘the hard problem is that of explaining the nature of things on which structure is
imposed, not the structure itself’ (2015, p. 161, emphasis added). As such, given that enactivist phenomenol-
ogy only speaks in terms of structured dynamics, they can only leave the gap as large as ever. Bayne (2004, p.
361) also posits this same predicament. In response, we might ask: what relevant things couldwe say about the
‘nature’ of conscious processes beyond their structure and causal efficacy? It is unclear what is being
demanded here. It seems equivalent to asking a scientist to explain the intrinsic nature of some physical
entity beyond its compositional structure and causal powers. Perhaps there is something else important here,
but I do not see it.
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commitments enactivists must make in order to retain the full philosophical force of
their ideas.
7 Radical enactivism: correcting inconsistencies
When assessing the explanatory benefits of enactivism’s proposal to Bgo wide^ with
perceptual experience— i.e. to appeal to world-involving processes of interaction in
subpersonal (cognitive scientific) explanation—Hutto and Myin state that ‘[t]he ex-
planatory value of this move is not undermined, even if it is accepted that the
supervenience basis of phenomenality is wholly brain-bound’ (p. xix).26 Though they
do not endorse the narrow-supervenience thesis, they are keen to suggest that their
Radical Enactivism is compatible with it. This kind of move goes directly counter to
positions held by many other contemporary enactivists.
A majority of prominent enactivists support the Extended Conscious Mind Thesis
(ECM): the material (constitutive) supervenience base of some kinds of experience
extends into the environment (Hurley 1998; Noë 2004; Pepper 2014; Thompson and
Cosmelli 2011; Ward 2012). The typical candidate here is perceptual experience
(Pepper 2014, p. 99). ECM about perceptual experience is thus a commitment to a
wide supervenience base.27
Hutto and Myin wish to retreat from this. Instead, they offer a metaphysical thesis
restricted to ‘basic cognition’. Basic cognition refers to foundational forms of cogni-
tion, including such things as cricket phonotaxis (pp. 42–43), but also relatively simple
aspects of human cognition. It is defined as ‘mental activity that exhibits intentional-
directedness, but it doesn’t necessarily imply phenomenality [i.e. phenomenal proper-
ties]’ (p. x). They claim that such basic cognition is ‘extensive’, i.e. ‘fundamentally,
constitutively already world-involving’ (p. 137). Yet they stress that this does not entail
a commitment on their part to conscious mental activity (such as perception) being
itself extensive.
This theoretical retreat seems highly problematic to me. I think that there is good
reason that enactivists tend towards ECM, for I suspect that the ‘explanatory value’ of
enactivism is indeed put in danger by Hutto and Myin’s stance here. What I find
problematic is not so much Hutto and Myin’s claim about basic cognition, it is the
claim that they can avoid ECM (a thesis of wide supervenience), in conjunction with
other claims they have made about enactivism’s explanatory value. As such, we must
first understand what they mean by ‘explanatory value’. This begins to be revealed in
the below quote:
It remains an open question whether the strategy of Bgoing wide^ for explanatory
purposes implies that the minimal supervenience base for phenomenality is like-
26 Though this quote is ambiguous, an interpretation of it as thematising perceptual phenomenality/experi-
ence, rather than only some (other) kinds of (non-perceptual) phenomenality/experience, is motivated by its
later evaluation in the context of ‘ordinary on-line perceiving’ (Hutto and Myin 2013, p. 161).
27 Note that on the current rendering a rejection of narrow supervenience does not entail a commitment to
ECM. ECM concerns the environment, while narrow supervenience concerns only the brain. One could argue
that perceptual experience supervenes on brain and (non-neural) body, but not the environment. However,
given that Hutto and Myin’s phenomenology is interactive, it is ECM that I focus on here.
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wise (i.e. extensive). Although a full and satisfying understanding of
phenomenality cannot be achieved without going wide, it is compatible with
the supervenience base for phenomenality remaining entirely confined to the
brain (2013, pp. 157-8, emphasis added)
We see here that it is understanding that is at stake. Going wide provides full and
satisfying understanding; this is its explanatory value. Thus, enactivism’s explanatory
value is preserved if it can offer such a full and satisfying account. However, it seems
that the authors’ attempts to make Radical Enactivism compatible with narrow
supervenience invoke two different kinds of understanding, which are themselves
inconsistent. Only one of these is full and satisfying. Furthermore, this kind is incom-
patible with narrow supervenience. My suggestion is therefore that Hutto and Myin
cannot claim to provide both of these forms of understanding; they must choose
between them based upon the philosophical work that they want Radical Enactivism
to do. Let me unpack this.
On the one hand, Hutto and Myin suggest that Bgoing wide^ provides a contextual
understanding. They note that ‘the strategy of going wide is necessary when trying to
understand the phenomenality of experience in a wider context’ (p. 165, emphasis
added). This is to say, such a cognitive-scientific story can tell us about the specific
sensorimotor patterns of interaction between organisms and environments that are
ordinarily needed in place for such experiences to occur (Ibid.), and which perceptual
experience has been historically tied to. This is to suggest that Bgoing wide^ with our
cognitive science can give us the typical contextual conditions of perceptual experi-
ence, whether these be real-time causal conditions, or historical conditions, without
taking these to be constitutive of perception, or ‘part of its metaphysical essence’
(Ibid.). Hutto and Myin rightly note that such contextual understanding is useful on
many counts, especially if we wish to understand how such experience arises in nature,
or the conditions under which it can be most easily generated (pp. 163–4).
This first kind of understanding is invoked while Hutto and Myin entertain chal-
lenges to ECM. They believe that the most powerful way to problematise ECM is the
‘Argument from Shared Phenomenality’ according to which very similar, if not
identical experience can occur in both the presence and the absence of organism-
environment interaction. For example, we might consider extravagant Swampman
thought experiments, where the neural activity of a perceiver is brought into being
from nowhere (Davidson 1987), or ‘direct neural manipulations of envatted brains’
(Hutto and Myin 2013, pp. 161–2). The suggestion here is that we can coherently
imagine the same kind of experience being preserved in the absence of real-time
environmental interaction, with appropriate metaphysical conclusions then being
drawn.
Alternatively, the Argument from Shared Phenomenality can be made by
referencing more mundane cases of supposed experiential overlap in the apparent
absence of environmental interaction, such as ‘individuals dreaming, imagining, and
suffering from Blocked in syndrome^’ (ibid). We might also imagine such things as
subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations. Broadly, all such arguments rest upon
motivating the possibility of shared phenomenality across cases of both online perceiv-
ing, where real-time environmental interaction is in place, and (often less epistemically
‘good’) cases where that interaction is absent. Hutto and Myin are suspicious of such
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arguments, yet want Radical Enactivism to remain standing even if these go through
(pp. 161–3). They thus use the hypothetical soundness of such arguments to motivate
invoking the above kind of contextual understanding.
On the other hand, however, we have a second form of understanding offered by
Hutto and Myin: a constitutive understanding. We have already seen that the authors
are keen to motivate identity claims between the mental and the physical (p. 157), and
suggest that this can be done by bringing our cognitive science and phenomenology
into a relation of structural resemblance. However, this can only motivate identity
claims if we take the science to be giving us a constitutive account of a mental process,
rather than a contextual account of how it came to be. Returning to an earlier
distinction, this means we must be offering a vertical rather than a horizontal explana-
tion. As such, Hutto and Myin here tie the explanatory value of enactive cognitive
science directly to its offering (i) a constitutive, vertical account that (ii) abides by SRC.
In this case then, they cannot divorce the explanatory value of enactivism from
metaphysical claims about relations of supervenience (i.e. constitutive supervenience,
here).
Additionally, I have shown SRC to be a domain-specific application of Churchland’s
criterion for reduction. And this is a criterion which seems to satisfy Hutto and Myin.
Indeed, they themselves promote this conception of reduction as a means to motivate
identity claims, stating that we should bring our explanatory criteria ‘in line with this
more liberal thinking about how identities can be established’ (p. 176), further moti-
vating the thought that this is indeed the kind of understanding they are keen to provide,
and again suggesting a supervenience entailment.
Having got these two kinds of understanding on the table, it is first immediately
clear that they are incompatible. Either one thinks that Bgoing wide^ with our cognitive
science is telling us about the causal/historical context of perceptual experience or one
thinks that it is telling us about its constitution and thus its supervenience base; one
cannot claim both from one explanation. So we have a curious oscillation here, on
Hutto and Myin’s part, between two different and incompatible forms of understanding.
28 Which one ought they then to favour? It seems clear to me that, given Hutto and
Myin’s claims about the explanatory gap, they ought to favour dropping the claims
about contextual understanding. Why so? Because it is only within the realm of a
constitutive understanding that we can hope to bridge the explanatory gap. Tackling the
gap requires accounting for what the mental is in terms of the physical, not accounting
for how it came about. It requires demonstrating conceptual overlap between things that
are already proposed as candidates for identity. And this is indeed what Radical
Enactivism sometimes seems to aim at in its demonstration of structural resemblance
between specific Binteractive^ phenomenological construals of perception, and
cognitive-scientific renderings of these same things that manifest an analogic interac-
tive structure at the global-level. What’s more, it seems to be in this engagement with
the explanatory gap that the explanatory value of enactivism is properly secured. Hutto
and Myin want to offer explanations that provide Bfull and satisfying^ understandings.
If they do not address the explanatory gap, they do not do this.
A second point can be made against the idea that enactivist cognitive science should
be construed as offering a merely contextual account. By definition, a contextual
28 See Froese (2014) for a similar assessment.
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account will invoke interactive subpersonal processes that are not themselves constitu-
tive of some mental process. A proposed contextual account of this kind would then
necessarily admit the possibility of some additional constitutive subpersonal story
about perceptual experience that could not feature subject-object interaction (given
that interaction is meant to frame this, and cannot therefore figure within it). Yet, given
Hutto and Myin’s emphasis upon an interactive phenomenology, this would dissolve
the central resemblance that they elsewhere invoke in support of their ideas (c.f. Ward
2012, pp. 734–5). So not only does their promotion of this kind of contextual
understanding fail to bridge the explanatory gap, it actively works against the way
they elsewhere suggest closing it.
This allows me to make a broader point then about enactivism in general. If
enactivists wish to maintain that they can address the explanatory gap, they simply
cannot be concessionary in the way that Hutto and Myin suggest. If enactivism is
allowed to be compatible with narrow supervenience, in spite of insistence upon an
interactively-structured phenomenology of perception, it will need to drop any endorse-
ment of SRC, and be content to offer more limited kinds of understanding.29 This,
however, would be to disarm enactivism of its major weapon against the explanatory
gap. Perhaps this is an appealing strategy for some, though I cannot imagine it would
satisfy Hutto and Myin, given their otherwise valuable remarks on this issue.30
A final way to motivate the above choice amongst the broader enactivist community
(opting for a constitutive construal of enactive cognitive science) is to note that it helps
enactivists retain their contention that phenomenology can have some bite. We can
stress here that there would be no reason at all to endorse SRC, as a means of
addressing the explanatory gap, unless one believed that one’s phenomenological
accounts were themselves accurate in some sense, that is to say, unless one believed
that they truthfully revealed something about the subpersonal make-up of perception.
This point is made by Noë (2007) who states that, if one wishes to avoid the ‘epistemic
isolation’ of phenomenology, one must be prepared to say that phenomenology makes
a theoretical commitment, which is accordingly subject to pressure from science (p.
232). After making the phenomenological claim that perceptual experience is ‘world-
involving’, he states that ‘if it turns out that it is possible for me to have an experience
of the same kind as a visual experience of a pencil in the absence of a pencil, then it
turns out that I am wrong about my phenomenology itself […] [for] I take a stand on
the theoretical question when I take a stand on the phenomenology’ (2007, p. 236).
29 Of course, opting for this more ambitious kind of understanding means that enactivists will need to offer
ways of countering the Argument from Shared Phenomenality. They might take, for example, the same line as
disjunctivists on this issue, denying that veridical perception and illusion/hallucination are of a common kind.
See also Thompson and Cosmelli (2011) and Hutto and Myin (2013, pp. 161-162) for further suggestions on
this issue.
30 There is an additional argument against SRC which may further motivate some enactivists to drop it. This is
due to Wheeler (2015) who notes that a constraint along SRC lines contradicts the occasional assertions of
sensorimotor enactivists that real-time interaction is not strictly necessary for perceptual experience. Instead,
the thought goes that one only needs a practical mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingencies that would
obtain were one to engage in certain motor behaviours (i.e. the possession of certain practical sensorimotor
knowledge) (pp. 169–173; cf. O’Regan 2011). Given Hutto and Myin’s deeply sceptical stance on the minimal
necessity of such knowledge however (2013, pp. 24–32), I think they are unlikely to find such an argument
convincing. See also Ward (2012, f7) for a response to Wheeler along these same lines.
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For these reasons, Ward (2012) argues that once enactivists have an interactive
phenomenology in play this makes it natural to resist any narrow subpersonal construal
of perceptual experience (and in turn favour ECM), for ‘the picture of the subpersonal
that would result from doing so threatens to make it unintelligible how their conception
of things at the personal level could be correct’ (p. 735). And surely enactivists like
Hutto and Myin do want to maintain that their proposed phenomenology is correct. If
this were not so, it would sit very oddly with their emphasis upon the importance of
reconceiving our phenomenology. Why would it matter how we conceive of the
phenomenology if its descriptions could be so readily bypassed?
Noë uses the above thoughts to highlight what he thinks is the contrast between
continental phenomenology as a disciplined examination of lived experience and the
Bintrospective^ tradition of phenomenological reflection, which too often conceives it
simply as a free-standing exercise - a ‘descriptive preliminary to theorising’ (p. 232)
that metaphysics then comes to supersede. And it is occasionally this kind of free-
standing conception that Hutto and Myin seem to be in danger of falling into when they
back-slide into claims about contextual understanding.
It must thus be emphasised that Noë’s contention that phenomenology makes a
theoretical commitment is a condition for endorsing SRC. Unless one holds one’s
phenomenology to make claims about the nature of the world, one has no reason for
thinking that phenomenology should have any influence when it comes to cognitive
science. As such, if the enactive project has any place for phenomenology it must, as
Noë remarks, conceive phenomenology to be ‘concerned with nature itself’ not only
with ‘how things seem’ (p. 234).
This brings to an end the substantive claims I wish to make in this paper. I now wish
to conclude on a more cautious note. For though I think that SRC is warranted, and that
the way it is wielded by enactivists suggests a promising route forwards, it must be
admitted that a number of significant concerns remain to be addressed here.
8 Questions going forwards and neurophenomenology
First and foremost, given that SRC affords phenomenology an ability to constrain
cognitive science, one must be careful to ensure it is being constrained by the right
phenomenology. Recapitulating an earlier worry: who is to say that an interactive
phenomenological account of perception is the correct one? One might claim that
phenomenological methods reveal perceptual experiences to be no more than mental
paint (Block 1990) or unequivocally representational in nature (Chalmers 2010, p.
334). This is an area of high controversy and complex debate, where arguments require
the extended justification of phenomenological methods that can work not merely at the
broad level, but also at the finer level, to isolate precisely what is central to perceptual
experience from what is perhaps tangential or contextual.31 The drawing of these lines
is no easy task.
Enactivists contend that certain individuals are well equipped to perform this
function, which does not in itself seem an unreasonable suggestion. But what are the
31 See Bayne and Spener (2010) for a more detailed sketch of this debate as manifest across the study of a
wider array of our experiences.
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best sources for maximally accurate and rigorous phenomenology? Certainly, suspi-
cions are likely to be raised by Hutto and Myin’s invocation of naïve or Bnatural^
introspective judgement as an appropriate source of phenomenological constraint. This
is highly unlikely to persuade without a great deal of argument that naïve descriptions
of experience somehow gain access to some wellspring of phenomenological truth that
abstract philosophising manages to miss.32
Perhaps the methods of continental phenomenology or Buddhist mindfulness med-
itation are more appropriate then here. Yet these are subject to their own criticisms. In
particular, there are concerns that such methods, as forms of mental training, also
change a subject’s experience, making it problematic to generalise from the phenom-
enological reports of such persons (e.g. Rupert 2015, p. 172, f9). A number of recent
arguments have sought to assuage such worries, suggesting that transformation of the
mind through training in no way rules out gaining insight into its pre-transformed
character. Colombetti (2014, p. 156) for example, agrees with Gallagher and Zahavi
(2008) that such training always ‘involves [both] a gain and a loss’ (p. 63), bringing out
certain aspects of experience, ordinarily implicit and hidden, at the expense of
distorting other aspects of that experience. However, further arguments can be offered
to explicate the scope of such gains and the significance of such loses, given that these
methods are playing such an important role in the theoretical work being produced.
In addition, further material can be offered by enactivists to crystallize precisely how
we can determine the accuracy of first-person methods. Existing options here include:
(i) intersubjective validation (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008) (ii) introspection-reliant
abilities (Spener 2015) and (iii) subpersonal constraints (e.g. Varela 1996), where
third-personal data is also used as a restraint upon our phenomenology. While I do
not wish to arbiter between these, I will end with a few remarks on the final of this trio
of options, for this possibility is particularly important to keep in mind for those who
might worry that SRC affords phenomenology an unreasonably strong influence.
It must be emphasised here that SRC does not leave our phenomenology immune
from constraints working in the opposite direction, namely from the scientific to the
phenomenological. In fact, SRC leaves open that our best phenomenological
characterisations might themselves need to be determined with the help of subpersonal
data. I will thus end here with some brief comments on the neurophenomenological
movement, often allied to enactivism, which has begun to delineate a way of combining
SRC with this opposite direction of constraint, resulting in a method of so-called
‘mutual constraints’ (Varela 1996).
Thompson et al. tell us that ‘[t]he [first] working hypothesis of neurophenomenology
in an experimental context’, which should be familiar given the material covered in this
paper, ‘is that phenomenologically precise first-person data produced by employing
first-person/second-person methods provide strong constraints on the analysis and
interpretation of the physiological processes relevant to consciousness’ (2005, pp.
46–7). In short, neurophenomenology assumes the value of SRC and looks for
subpersonal physiological dynamics showing structural resemblance to aspects of
32 This is not to say that this is not a potentially fruitful avenue to pursue. Given that such conceptions (folk
and philosophical) are neither univocal nor atemporal, sociological and historical investigations of the diverse,
shifting understandings of human experience (and indeed Bthe physical^) will likely prove valuable tools for
addressing the explanatory gap. This would be to venture into the realm of experimental philosophy.
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the phenomenology. Doing so, it aims to reveal previously unrecognised
physiological dynamics that are critical to the mental process being thematised.
In a famous example, Lutz et al. (2002) examined the experience wherein a
subject gradually perceives a three-dimensional figure emerging from an auto-
stereogram, showing that subtle transitions between various stages of this experi-
ence (described from the first-person) were mirrored by transitions into distinct
stages of Bphase synchrony^ across different regions of the brain.33
It is particularly important to note here though that neurophenomenology was also
described as a method that would employ constraints in the reverse direction, i.e. it
would also use subpersonal data to help evaluate the phenomenological descriptions
on offer and to make amendments to invoked phenomenology (Varela 1996). Thomp-
son et al. (2005) note that this data can ‘provoke revisions and refinements of the
phenomenological accounts’ (p. 47). For example, should a phenomenological report
suggest structural features that seem strongly discordant with those found in the
subpersonal dynamics, the subject might be asked to re-examine this aspect of their
experience. Attending more intimately to this part of experience might then yield
different phenomenological reports. However, Thompson et al. go on to note that
appropriately discordant third-person data can also give the subject a means of latching
onto ‘previously inaccessible’ aspects of their experience (ibid.). It can give the subject
something to look for. When (or perhaps, if) this something is found and examined in
more detail from the first-person perspective, this might allow richer phenomenological
details about this part of the experience to emerge, that can then be used, in turn, to
discover (i.e. look for) relevant (structurally-resemblant) finer-grained subpersonal
dynamics. Thus, by combining the two directions of influence, we are supposed to
use phenomenological and scientific data as ‘reciprocal constraints’ to help us improve
each one, and home in upon what is central (Varela 1996, p. 343). Engaging in this
neurophenomenological back-and-forth is thus intended to catalyse the production of
ever stronger structural resemblances, which Varela himself saw as part of a ‘method-
ological solution to the hard problem’ (ibid.).
Unfortunately, this reverse constraint from science to phenomenology is seldom
evidenced in neurophenomenological experiments, and far more evidence of the
efficacy of the method of mutual constraints is needed. Furthermore, even with a
method of reciprocal constraints, we have a problem, for it leaves us uncertain precisely
when we are supposed to reverse the direction of constraint. In other words, how long
do we allow our phenomenology to hold sway as a constraint upon our science, instead
of applying the constraint in the reverse direction? 34 We must remember that
33 Of course, this experiment demonstrates only a weak resemblance between phenomenology and neural
dynamics, capturing a shared temporal structure. To strengthen structural resemblance between
phenomenology and the subpersonal, enactivists believe we will need to extend our constitution base
beyond the brain. This is something that Colombetti (2014) notes in her programme for affective science
(the study of feeling/emotion): ‘observing brain activity provides only a partial glance into the organismic
activities that enact lived experience […] This is also why neurophenomenology, which has so far limited its
third-person methods to brain activity, ought to include recordings of bodily activity—thus becoming what I
shall call […] neuro-physio-phenomenology’ (p. 143). And in the case of perceptual experience, if we buy an
interactive phenomenology, a constitution base will need to include the organism’s environment, delineated in
terms akin to the ‘Radical Embodied Neuroscience’ of Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014).
34 Thanks to Mike Wheeler (personal correspondence) for this point.
Roberts M.
resemblance can be generated by modifying either the phenomenal or the subpersonal
relata, and thus be prepared to do either one.35
This relates to another problem that enactivists more broadly must deal with. Namely,
enactivism’s preferred method of operationalising SRC—neurophenomenology—seems
to construe third-person constraints as acting primarily as refinements to the phenomenol-
ogy, i.e. as suggesting alterations within their interactive phenomenological picture, rather
than allowing any major overhaul of this interactive conception, thus yielding a rather a
one-sided rendering of the mutual constraint method. Perhaps the neurophenomenologist
is warranted in replying to the effect that Blook, we need to begin somewhere and, given
that we’re interested in conscious processes, and that these only emerge as targets from
phenomenological reflection, we should give this a certain priority in characterising
the targets.^ Nevertheless, such reply leaves open important questions about the
precise range of judgements for which phenomenological reflection will have
priority, and more must be said about how to non-arbitrarily carve off such a region.
Finally, given any such neurophenomenological commitment to the authority of
phenomenology in such domains (i.e. concerning the broad shape of our experiences),
it is evident that something distinct from third-personal data will be needed to ascertain
the validity of such first-person descriptions. This might concern the methodological
criteria for good phenomenological reflection itself, which is something that other
neurophenomenology enthusiasts have picked up on recently (see e.g. Bitbol and
Petitmengin 2016; Petitmengin 2009; Petitmengin and Bitbol 2009), though this will
need fleshing out more fully to satisfy sceptics.
These are all questions that the contemporary enactivist must address if they wish to
continue making use of SRC in the manner that they have done so thus far. But
however these questions are answered, I believe that the enactivist promotion of SRC
as a standalone constraint is a reasonable one. What’s more, I hope that SRC’s outline
here, if it has any take-home message, demonstrates the indispensability of phenome-
nology to cognitive science and philosophy, and the importance of doing it well.
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